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Talented but unaware? An analysis of the role of  
self-assessment in educational transition 
 
Tamás Keller 
 
Abstract 
 
Why are talented pupils who come from low-status families reluctant to choose knowledge-
intensive educational routes? Throughout this paper we try to answer this question, 
employing the framework of sociological rational choice theory. Our argumentation is that (1) 
the perception of one’s own ability (self-assessment) is dissimilar among pupils with different 
parental backgrounds. Furthermore, (2) educational choices are influenced not exclusively by 
ability, but also by subjective beliefs about one’s own talent. Finally, (3) educational choices 
are not identical across social classes, because pupils with different parental backgrounds 
estimate their own abilities differently. The hypotheses are tested using individual-level panel 
data from the Hungarian Life Course Survey (HLCS). The sample contains 9,050 pupils (aged 
14–15) who finished primary education in the academic year 2005/06, began secondary 
education in autumn 2006, and tertiary education in 2010 or 2011.  
 
Keywords: self-assessment; self-confidence; transition to secondary and tertiary 
education; school tracks; inequality in educational opportunities; tracking in education; 
educational panel data; Hungarian Life Course Survey (HLCS) 
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Az önértékelés szerepe a továbbtanulási döntésekben 
 
Tamás Keller 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A tanulmány annak a kérdésnek a megválaszolásához kíván hozzájárulni, hogy milyen 
tényezők állhatnak a tehetséges, ám alacsony társadalmi státusú diákok alacsony szintű 
továbbtanulási hajlandósága mögött. A tanulmány fő érvelése szerint az iskolai teljesítmény 
megítélésében jelentős státuskülönbségek mutathatóak ki, és az alacsonyabb státusú diákok – 
magasabb státusú társaikhoz képest – módszeresen alábecsülik saját teljesítményüket. A 
továbbtanulási döntések során nem csupán a tényleges iskolai teljesítmény, hanem annak 
percepciója is számít. A társadalmi háttér szerint különböző önértékelés tehát hozzájárul a 
továbbtanulási döntések mögött meghúzódó státuskülönbségekhez. Hipotéziseimet egyéni-
szintű panel adatbázison, az Életpálya kutatáson, tesztelem. Mintám 9050, javarészt 14-15 
éves, diákot tartalmaz; olyanokat, akik a 2005/06-os tanévben fejezték be általános iskolai 
tanulmányaikat, 2006 őszén kezdték meg középfokú iskoláikat és 2010 után kezdhették meg 
főiskolai vagy egyetemi tanulmányaikat. 
 
Tárgyszavak: önértékelés, önbizalom, továbbtanulási döntések, iskolai esélyegyenlőség, 
panel adatok, Életpálya kutatás 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Why are low-status pupils less likely to choose knowledge-intensive educational routes? This 
paper aims to build on previous research into educational decisions and inequality in 
educational opportunities, and seeks answers in the framework of rational choice models in 
sociology, with a focus on understanding status differences in educational transitions. As a 
new aspect, it investigates the class differences in subjective estimations about pupils’ own 
abilities; these could be linked to the parameter of success probability in rational choice 
models and could be psychological in character. That said, the theoretical part of the paper 
builds on the already established bridge between two streams of research: inequality of 
educational opportunity and self-estimation.  
The literature of educational inequality acknowledges strong status differences in pupils’ 
educational performance (Checchi, 2006). This vein of research also understands that the 
impact of parental background (usually measured as the occupational or educational status of 
parents) is not restricted to differences in primary factors – such as ability or school 
performance – but also has secondary effects, which manifest themselves in (often non-
cognitive or non-rational) factors that contribute to socially different educational decisions 
(Boudon, 1974). Our knowledge is, however, rather limited as to whether status differences in 
non-cognitive factors are responsible for the same differences in educational outcomes. This 
is quite surprising, as it is over thirty years since Murphy (1981) suggested concentrating 
more on socially unequally distributed educational aspirations (as non-cognitive factors) in 
educational inequality research; and yet there is hardly any empirical evidence.  
In this research our main aim is to find out whether the perception of one’s own abilities 
(self-assessment) is differently distributed according to social status, and whether these 
differences are responsible for choosing different educational routes. Underestimated ability 
might have an impact on educational decisions, because unrecognized personal talent could 
stand in the way of people choosing a knowledge-intensive educational route (Sjögren and 
Sällström, 2004), simply because they do not dare to obtain better school qualifications, 
which they could easily have done had they only tried. Overestimated ability, on the other 
hand – if someone overrates his own talent – might increase the probability of failure. 
Despite this risk, however, as Filippin and Paccagnella (2011) showed in their model, those 
who initially overestimate their abilities will follow more ambitious educational roads if they 
have access to a greater volume of knowledge. The increase in knowledge accumulated will be 
translated to narrowing the gap in human capital between those with and without self-
confidence.   
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The main contribution of this paper to previous findings is that the perception of one’s 
own ability (self-assessment) is not similarly distributed among pupils with different parental 
backgrounds. Lower-status pupils usually underestimate their abilities, even at the same 
objective level. Among adolescents with the same skill level and grade point average, those 
who have greater confidence in their abilities have a better chance of choosing a knowledge-
intensive educational route. The results also support the finding that the gap between low- 
and high-status pupils in terms of their educational decisions could be explained by their 
different levels of self-assessment.  
II. EDUCATIONAL TRANSITIONS AND MAINTAINED INEQUALITIES  
II.1. PREVIOUS RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
Stocké et al. (2011) claim that there are several theoretical frameworks to explain inequalities 
in educational opportunities. Rational choice theory rose to its relative importance among the 
other theories after Boudon’s (1974) seminal work, in which he explained that the impact of 
social background also manifests itself in the form of different educational decisions made at 
the same level of ability. The core question of rational choice theories in sociology after 
Boudon has been to find out why pupils in different social classes make different educational 
decisions, even if their abilities are the same.  
Class differences in educational decisions emerge because social classes are different in at 
least three characteristics: risk aversion, expectation of success and resources (Breen and 
Goldthorpe, 1997). Relative risk aversion means that people in every social class strive to 
maintain the same status from an intergenerational perspective. Individuals believe that by 
reaching a particular educational threshold, they will reach the same social class position as 
their parents. The cost of pursuing any further education (in terms of real cost, forgone 
earning, risk of failure to complete) outweighs the utility of opting for more education (Breen 
and Yaish, 2006). Social classes also differ in terms of ability and interpretation of success. 
Higher social classes have higher-level ability, and differences in ability are believed to 
capture differences in the subjective estimation of success, if pupils derive self-belief from 
previous success, and if previous failure destroys optimism for success. This also means that 
pupils in lower social groups should have a greater assurance of success if they choose the 
same educational outcomes as their peers in more advantaged social classes. Lastly, social 
classes have different levels of resources, in terms of direct material resources (to buy 
textbooks, pay tuition fees) and the tolerance of opportunity costs in the form of forgone 
earnings and benefits. 
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There have been several empirical attempts to prove sociological rational action theory. 
Need and Jong (2000) investigated the decision of whether to go on to tertiary education, 
using Dutch panel data. They found that educational choice is highly determined by the 
educational aspirations (the desired degree) of pupils – even after controlling for grade point 
average, subjective ability (the level of education that pupils thought they could complete at 
best) and the net monthly family income of parents. Hartlaub and Schneider (2012) used 
data from the German Socioeconomic Panel Study and distinguished between structural (a 
family’s social status) and individual (personal willingness to avoid risk) risk aversion. Based 
on their findings – after controlling for grade point average and disposable family income – 
students in upper social classes are structurally almost compelled to choose academically 
oriented educational courses. Working-class children, however, have more ‘freedom’ in this 
choice, which is also influenced by individual risk aversion. Explaining schooling ambitions, 
van de Werfhorst and Hofstede (2007) have similar results, finding relative risk aversion to 
be a relevant factor in the explanation. Stocké (2007) used German panel data to explain 
class differences in the choice of secondary school. He found the chances of a child’s success 
in further education, as estimated by the parents, to be the strongest predictor in the decision 
to choose between various secondary school tracks (Hauptschule, Realschule, Gymnasium). 
From the psychological side of our research emerge two major concepts: self-esteem and 
self-efficacy. James (1890: 310) introduced the notion of self-esteem, which is the success 
achieved by a person, relative to that person’s expectations of himself. If someone has high 
self-esteem, he either has good performance (large numerator) or low expectations (small 
denominator). Self-esteem (operationalized by Rosenberg, 1965) is considered to maintain 
protection against psychological or physical stress arising from the fear of performing badly 
(Himmler and Koenig, 2012), which could explain why it is important in educational 
decisions. Its positive impact on educational outcomes (Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006) 
is challenged by the findings of Himmler and Koenig. Whereas self-esteem belongs to feelings 
about oneself, self-efficacy is the capacity to accomplish tasks successfully (Bandura, 1982). 
Since judgements of success determine personal motivation (e.g. persistence in striving to 
attain a particular goal), self-efficacy influences learning activities via such self-regulatory 
processes as setting goals, evaluating one’s own performance or choosing an appropriate 
strategy to achieve the intended goal (Zimmerman, 2000: 87). As people engage in tasks 
where they think they will succeed, self-efficacy is believed to be a powerful predictor of 
choice of career or university majors (empirical evidence is summarized by Pajares, 1996). 
Other empirical research supports the notion that children’s beliefs about their own ability 
and their expectation of success strongly influence educational outcomes, even if previous 
performance is controlled for (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000).  
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There are two features of these notions (self-esteem, self-efficacy) which play a crucial 
role in our research: the link to real (school) performance, and the importance of social 
comparison. Particularly self-efficacy depends strongly on constructive feedback about 
performance and on prior success (Schunk, 1985). Empirical research has shown that 3rd 
graders who received feedback about their ability performed better at school (Schunk, 1983). 
Social comparison theory in self-concept (Marsh and Hau, 2003; Marsh & Yeung, 1998; 
Marsh et al., 2008) assumes that academic self-concept is positively influenced by one’s own 
performance, but is counterbalanced somewhat by the negative impact of peer performance. 
The ‘big fish, little pond’ effect claims that, even if individual academic skills would improve 
in a strongly selective good school, the gain is mitigated by the fact that strong peer 
performance decreases individual self-concept and thus – indirectly (through the channel of 
self-concept) – leads to a decrease in individual performance.  
II.2. OUR APPROACH 
 
Esser (1999: 266–75) subtracts two other important class differences from the notions of 
sociological rational choice theory: investment risk and educational motivation. Investment 
risk (C/p) is interpreted as cost (C) divided by the perceived probability of success (p), while 
educational motivation is U+c×SV, where U is the utility of a particular educational option, 
SV is loss in status if this educational option is not acquired, and c is the perceived 
probability of this status lost. A particular educational option occurs when educational 
motivation exceeds investment risk (U+c×SV>C/p). By definition, lower classes have lower 
educational motivation, because their status could be secured through less-extensive 
education. Therefore, in the case of lower classes, educational motivation equals U, because 
c×SV is close to 0.  
Following this framework, educational motivation is always lower in the case of the 
underclass, because the fear of status loss is ruled out. Assuming C to be constant, investment 
risk depends only on the perceived probability of success. So pupils in the lowest class – as 
shown in Figure 1 – should have an educational motivation of at least point p2 or higher, if 
they are to opt for the same level of education chosen by their middle-class peers. Middle-
class pupils, since they are pushed by the fear of status loss, could attain the same level of 
education with a lower probability of success. In order to achieve the equilibrium in 
educational opportunities, pupils from the middle class should be plotted at point M and 
underclass pupils at point U on the graph. However, again, the widely documented gap in 
educational performance shows that pupils with different class positions could be quite far 
away (and in opposite directions) from the equilibrium point; middle-class pupils at m and 
underclass pupils at u. 
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Figure 1 
The association between educational motivation and probability of success – 
points of equilibrium and perceived deviation from it, by parental background 
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From previous literature, however, one can suspect that the probability of success does 
not compensate for the low level of educational motivation among low-status pupils. 
Adolescents (and their parents) from a disadvantaged background might underestimate their 
performance, because they have inaccurate information on the importance of effort and 
ability in the educational system. Some empirical findings (Sullivan, 2006) reveal this 
assumption. Pupils were asked to guess the outcome of their GCSE exam a few months before 
they actually sat it. A comparison of the estimates with the actual results showed that pupils 
from lower classes systematically underestimated their abilities, compared to their more 
advantaged peers. Since only a month or so elapsed between the measurement of self-
assessed and real performance, reverse causation (with working-class pupils making more 
rapid progress in the short time before the GCSE exam) could be excluded.  
That said, this paper deals with the question of whether subjective estimations about 
one’s own ability play any role in educational transitions. The subjective estimations are 
interpreted as part of the probability of success in sociological rational choice theory. Since 
the theory is interested in class differences in educational decisions, this analysis focuses also 
on class differences in the estimation of own talent and the consequences for future 
educational transitions.  
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III. DATA AND DEFINITIONS 
III.1 DATA 
 
During empirical analysis, we will use the Hungarian Life Course Survey (HLCS) – an 
individual panel survey conducted by TÁRKI Social Research Institute on a yearly basis – 
from the academic year 2006/07, with an initial sample of nearly 10,000 largely 14–15-year-
olds (most of whom had embarked on the 9th grade in that academic year). This survey can 
be merged with 8th grade (from the academic year 2005/06) test scores in mathematics and 
reading literacy skills for the same students, measured by the Hungarian National 
Assessment of Basic Competences (NABC) organized by the Hungarian educational 
authority. NABC contains administrative data about the entire school cohort. The sample of 
HLCS was selected in 2006 from the population of 8th grade pupils with valid test scores in 
NABC (see Figure A1 in the Appendix for the design of HLCS). 
In the analysis we focus on two educational transitions. These are not the first 
educational choices that someone makes in his or her life; therefore educational decisions 
analysed in this paper are already consequences of previous decisions. The reason for 
focusing even on these choices is that supposedly the transition to secondary education is the 
first educational decision where pupils themselves have a say (not just their parents). The 
vast majority of adolescents in the sample (nearly 75 per cent) reported that they made the 
decision about secondary school (at age 14) alone.  
The educational transition analysed first in this paper occurs when pupils are 14–15 years 
old, when they are in their last year of elementary education (which usually lasts eight 
years).1 When pupils are in the 8th grade, at the beginning of the second semester they draw 
up an order of preference for the secondary school they would like to attend. Pupils are 
admitted to these schools on the basis of their preference ordering and their results in the 
admission test and/or school marks; or if there are free places at the school. Elementary 
school leavers can choose from three school types: secondary general (gimnázium) and 
secondary vocational (szakközépiskola) education provide a later opportunity to enter 
tertiary education, whereas there is no direct entry from a vocational school (szakiskola) to 
tertiary education (see Figure A2 in the Appendix on the educational choices and possible 
educational scenarios). Since HLCS was launched among 9th graders, the consequences of 
the choice of secondary education can be analysed (which track pupils are following at the 
                                                 
1 Pupils also have the opportunity to enter secondary general school after the 4th or the 6th grade. These pupils 
are usually the most talented. However, for the purposes of this analysis, these students are excluded because of 
the lack of appropriate data. 
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beginning of the school year), however the survey provides retrospective information about 
the previous academic year (see Figure A1 in the Appendix on the design of HLCS).  
The second educational transition analysed here occurs after the completion of 
compulsory education (see Figure A2 in the Appendix on the educational choices and 
possible educational scenarios). Pupils basically have three options: they can enter tertiary 
education (college or university); begin post-secondary but not tertiary education; or enter 
the labour market. In Hungary, there are no general tuition fees for tertiary education: there 
is a dual system in operation, under which some students pay tuition fees, while others do 
not. But the vast majority of students study free of charge. The first degree is financed by the 
state (according to a quota determined annually by the government) in the case of those who 
obtain an adequate level in the entrance examination. This regulation basically means that 
approximately every second applicant can study free of charge at university level.2 Therefore, 
in the case of the second educational transition analysed in this paper, the population 
consists of those who have their high-school final exam (érettségi) and have completed 
secondary education within five years of commencing it (there are no data about the 
respondents later; HLCS has six completed waves). Fee-paying university places usually have 
lower requirements: pupils are admitted with worse admission tests or school marks; 
moreover, applications to such places are strongly related to social status. The dependent 
variable in the second educational decision is, therefore, those who have been admitted to 
state-financed tertiary educational training.  
III.2 DEFINITIONS 
 
The framework used in our research has four important elements: educational transition or 
choice (the dependent variable), ability, parental background and self-assessment. This 
section introduces these variables. 
We use a very simple classification of educational choice, which is not influenced by the 
compositional effect of pupils at different schools. At the secondary level, there are three 
possible scenarios (secondary general school – gimnázium; secondary vocational school – 
szakközépiskola; and vocational school – szakiskola). The term ‘secondary school’ 
(középiskola) will be used hereafter as a generic term for secondary general and secondary 
vocational school. In the empirical models, we employ two dummy variables. The first is 
coded 1 if someone was admitted to secondary school (secondary general or secondary 
vocational school – the schools from which there is access to tertiary education) and 0 if 
someone is at a vocational school. The second dependent variable deals with the difference 
between secondary general school (coded 1) and secondary vocational school (coded 0). The 
                                                 
2 http://www.felvi.hu/felveteli/ponthatarok_rangsorok/elmult_evek/!ElmultEvek/elmult_evek.php?stat=4 
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reason for using binary categories rather than multinomial is that the choice between general 
and vocational secondary schools is a horizontal decision, while the choice between 
vocational school and any other kind of secondary school is vertical.3 At the tertiary level we 
examine those who have been admitted to tertiary education (coded 1) among those who had 
the possibility – i.e. sat the high-school final exam – of entering tertiary education (coded 0). 
Table 1 contains the mean, standard deviation and the number of observations for the three 
dependent variables.  
Table 1 
Mean, standard deviation and number of cases of the three dependent variables 
in analysis, by parental background 
 
 Dependent variables used in the analysis  
 
Parental 
background 
 
Admitted to secondary 
school/vocational school 
Admitted to secondary 
general 
school/secondary 
vocational school 
Admitted to state-
financed tertiary 
education training 
Elementary school 
mean 45.63% 18.72% 12.53% 
sd 49.82% 39.03% 33.15% 
N 1979 903 391 
Vocational school 
mean 67.05% 27.71% 21.52% 
sd 47.01% 44.76% 41.11% 
N 3827 2566 1566 
High-school final 
exam 
mean 84.70% 39.91% 32.06% 
sd 36.01% 48.99% 46.69% 
N 2189 1854 1235 
Tertiary education 
mean 94.12% 66.87% 52.03% 
sd 23.53% 47.09% 49.99% 
N 1055 993 713 
Total 
mean 69.79% 36.16% 29.53% 
sd 45.92% 48.05% 45.62% 
N 9050 6316 3905 
 
 
Self-assessment is measured using the question: ‘What do you think about your 
achievement in a test in your 8th grade class where the total available score is 100 and the 
average in your class is 70?’ Note that this question refers to performance at 8th grade (when 
students completed the NABC competence test), and so is a kind of retrospective question (it 
was asked in the first wave of HLCS, when students had already begun 9th grade). Moreover, 
it is worth mentioning that the wording of the question does not suggest the type of test. One 
can only guess that the test probably measures some cognitive ability (rather than ability in 
sport, art, etc.), since the ‘achievement’ is asked. Obviously the question measures self-
assessment with noise, but this is the only available proxy for that in the dataset. 
                                                 
3 Results are consistent using multinomial logit; results are available from the author on request.  
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Ability or academic/school performance is measured by standardized test scores 
(assessed at 8th grade) in mathematics and reading literacy, and by school marks. 
Competence scores are regarded as a proxy for ability, and school marks as additional 
information deriving from the educational system but not connected to ability (teachers’ 
evaluation). Note that even competence scores can be regarded as an outcome of the school 
system, and therefore be biased. However, this is the only available standardized measure for 
ability in the survey. We use composite indices for competence scores and for school marks 
as well. Both measures are a result of principal component analysis (PCA). Competence-score 
PCA uses maths and reading literacy scores as primary variables, and school-marks PCA the 
maths and Hungarian grammar and literature marks (results of PCA and descriptive 
statistics about the primary variables appear in Tables A1 to A3 in the Appendix). Both school 
marks and competence scores are measured at the end of the 8th grade academic year, before 
secondary education begins. If values in school marks are missing, previous semester school 
marks are used. Pupils with special educational needs (SEN) had only competence scores in 
reading comprehension available. In order not to lose them from the analysis, missing maths 
competence scores were replaced with reading comprehension scores (SEN appears among 
the control variables).  
Parental background is defined by the highest level of schooling for the father (biological 
or stepfather); if information about the father is missing, the mother’s highest level of 
schooling is used.4 Occupation is a more frequently used proxy for social class, but 
unfortunately that is not available in HLCS. We assume anyway that in terms of educational 
decisions, schooling is a better proxy for social class than is occupation. This assumption is 
supported by Róbert (1986), who found a strong relationship between parental education and 
children’s educational attainments. Moreover, it is more likely that better-educated parents 
devote more emphasis to spending time with their children and helping them to build a real 
self-image. 
Descriptive statistics about self-assessment, competence scores and school marks are 
summarized in Table 2. Since all variables are z-standardized (zero mean, one standard 
deviation) the differences in parental background are easily noticeable. There is at least one 
standard deviation difference between those whose fathers have only elementary education 
and those whose fathers graduated from tertiary education.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Results are robust to use of other kinds of definition for social class position, such as the higher score from 
mother’s and father’s education.  
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Table 2 
Mean, standard deviation and number of cases of self-assessment and the most 
important ability measures in 8th grade, by parental background  
(every variable is standardized) 
Parental 
background 
 Self-assessment 
(standardized) 
Competence-scores 
(standardized) 
School-marks 
(standardized) 
Elementary school 
mean -0.45 -0.62 -0.42 
sd 0.87 0.81 0.94 
N 1979 1979 1979 
Vocational school 
mean -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 
sd 0.95 0.87 0.97 
N 3827 3827 3827 
High-school final 
exam 
mean 0.28 0.34 0.24 
sd 0.97 0.95 0.96 
N 2189 2189 2189 
Tertiary education 
mean 0.74 0.85 0.62 
sd 0.88 1.01 0.89 
N 1055 1055 1055 
Total 
mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 
sd 1.00 1.00 1.00 
N 9050 9050 9050 
 
IV. ENDOGENEITY ISSUES 
 
In an ideal situation, self-assessment should be measured before the educational transition. 
In our case, however, self-assessment is retrospective. It is asked at the beginning of the 9th 
grade, but it refers to the 8th grade. Since the wording of the self-assessment measure (SA) 
refers to 8th grade performance, if it were not asked retrospectively, the causality assumption 
would hold – simply because of the temporal ordering between cause and effect.  
Let us assume the following equation (Eq.1):  
 
y = α + β1×SA + β2×A + µ +ɛ       (Eq.1) 
 
where y is the dependent variable, which is educational transition; SA is self-assessment; A is 
ability, µ is time-invariant unobserved characteristics; and ɛ is a time-variant individual error 
term, while α and β are the parameters in question. Because of the retrospective nature of the 
self-assessment measure, we assume: 
 
cov(SA,ɛ) ≠ 0           (Eq.2) 
 
Reverse causality (Eq.2) might emerge because something shocked individual 
perceptions, and under the influence of this shock pupils’ estimations of their own ability are 
biased. This shock is captured in ɛ (in Eq.1) and therefore Eq.2 holds. If we could identify this 
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shock (which will be our approach), reverse causality could be regarded as an omitted 
variable problem. 
Educational transition (y) can only be made after elementary education is completed 
(after the 8th grade, in this case). Application to secondary education, however, occurred 
before NABC or HLCS, and even before the admission tests to any secondary school (see 
Figure A1 in the Appendix). Note that pupils enter secondary education on the basis of the 
order of preference they indicate on their application, and on the basis of their results in the 
admission test. Usually pupils rank better schools higher on their order of preference. It 
should also be noted that usually more competitive schools prescribe an ability test, and 
schools without a good reputation cannot select pupils. Hence, while pupils’ order of 
preference for secondary schools is exogenous, self-assessment could be endogenous, since it 
is measured after the application procedure to secondary school. It is very reasonable to 
assume that those who do not get into the school that is first on their preference list 
downgraded their 8th grade performance retrospectively. This kind of systematic shock in 
self-assessment is more likely to occur among those who perform relatively well, since they 
apply to better schools with admission tests, while those with relatively weak performance get 
into secondary education anyway.5 Therefore a dummy variable is included to control for 
whether somebody gained a place at their first-choice secondary school.  
Another important issue in the identification of the shock which might bias our self-
assessment measure is that those who were admitted to a competitive secondary school could 
upgrade their self-assessment retrospectively; and the same is true in the opposite direction 
for those who were admitted to a weak secondary school. We computed a school-quality 
measure for elementary schools, taking the school average of 8th grade competence-score 
PCA. The quality of the secondary school was estimated using NABC data on 10th graders in 
2006. Here again school averages were calculated, and these means were merged with the 
HLCS data set using school ID as the key variable. In the second step, both school-quality 
measures were divided into 100 equal categories and we took the difference of secondary and 
(minus) elementary school quality measure, as a proxy for the change in school quality.  
A second possible type of endogeneity might be caused by omitted variables. There are 
two possible types of omitted variables: those which have time-variant characteristics (these 
variables are captured in ɛ and cause problems as indicated in Eq.2), and those which are 
time-invariant (like type of personality, motivation), which are captured in µ in Eq.1. Even in 
an ideal situation (which is clearly not the case) when there are several measures of self-
assessment and ability, one is not able entirely to eliminate all the unobserved individual 
                                                 
5 For the particular cohort which is in the scope of this analysis, compulsory education lasted until the age of 18. 
That means that those who completed elementary education ought to have spent at least a couple of years in 
secondary education, depending on their age. There is no way of quitting the educational system. 
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characteristics using first-difference or fixed effects models, since the dependent variable 
(educational transition) does not have a time-variant component. Therefore we assumed 
Eq.3: 
cov(SA,µ) ≠ 0          (Eq.3) 
 
In terms of individual characteristics, which might correlate with ability, there is no way 
to distinguish ɛ from µ. We assumed that the bias of non-observed ability is distributed 
equally, at least according to social status. Note that to some extent school marks could also 
capture latent ability not measured by competence scores. 
Another issue involves distinguishing self-assessment from psychological measures. 
These measures might be captured in µ since they are believed to be time invariant. HLCS 
contains information about Rosenberg’s self-esteem, Rotter’s locus of control scale and 
Harter’s social competence scores. Rotter’s (1966) locus of control scale measures the degree 
of control that individuals have over their lives. Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem estimates the 
overall evaluation of one’s worth or value. Harter’s (1982) social competence scores provide 
information on whether somebody feels they are an important member of the school class. 
Moreover, a depression scale was constructed from questions about anxiety and suicidal 
thoughts. The psychological variables applied are not appropriate to control for every 
individual-level characteristic (achievement orientation, preferences for education, 
occupational aspirations), which obviously correlate both with educational choices and with 
self-assessment, but one can assume that these individual features correlate highly with 
them.  
The third possible type of endogeneity would be the unobserved school-level 
heterogeneity (captured in µ), which might also bias the estimation of self-assessment. Since 
rating of one’s own performance is always relative (because it is based on social comparison), 
endogeneity might occur if there is a sorting of students across schools. The heterogeneity of 
schools in Hungary is considered by other researchers to be quite remarkable (Horn, 2013). 
Moreover it is easy to assume that pupils/parents select schools in order to maximize the 
peer effect, or that motivated parents send their offspring to schools with high teacher 
quality. The same issue emerges if teachers who prefer personality-based education select 
schools based on their pedagogical programme, so that not just pupils but also teachers are 
not randomly distributed among schools. Even though HLCS is not a classroom survey, 
classroom-level information can be merged with it from NABC, in order to control for school 
fixed effects.  
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V. EMPIRICAL MODELS 
 
First, we test whether the perceptions of their own ability are identical for pupils with 
different parental backgrounds. A linear probability model is employed, where self-
assessment is explained by parental background, controlling for ability. Eq.4 shows the 
model estimated, where SA stands for self-assessment, PB for parental background, and A is 
a vector for ability containing school marks and competence scores. The competence score 
appears in the class average and individual deviation from this average. Class average would 
show the impact of school performance if individual deviations are 0, or if somebody 
performs at an average level for his class. Because of the retrospective nature of the self-
assessment, it was necessary to include vector T, containing three variables. The first is the 
difference in school quality between secondary and elementary school; the second is a 
dummy variable showing whether missing cases were set to 0 (no difference between 
elementary and secondary school); and the third is whether the respondent was admitted to 
the first-choice school in secondary education. P is the vector of psychological variables, 
containing psychological traits like locus of control, social competence, self-esteem and 
inclination to depression. C is a vector representing individual controls like gender, year of 
birth, number of siblings, birth order and fixed effects, whether the respondent needs special 
education or is Roma, plus type of settlement and county; ε is an individual error term; the β-
s are the vectors of ordinary least squares coefficients; and α is the constant in the equation. 
The results appear in Table 3. Throughout the analysis we are most interested in β1 (the 
impact of parental background) and β3 (the difference in the impact of ability by parental 
background).  
 
   (Eq.4)  
 
The second research question is about educational transitions, and the role of self-
assessment is the focus of analysis. Three different dependent variables are employed 
(descriptive statistics are available in Table 1). In case of the transition from elementary to 
secondary education, the dependent variable is those who were admitted to secondary school 
(secondary general and secondary vocational) versus those at vocational school. In a second 
set of models, we analyse the difference between secondary general and secondary vocational 
schools. Lastly, the transition to state-financed tertiary education is analysed. In this set of 
models, the population contains those who completed secondary education (secondary 
general or secondary vocational school) within five years of commencing it. Among the right-
hand variables appears self-assessment (SA), ability (A), parental background (PB), 
information about the admission test (T), psychological controls (P), and other individual-
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level control variables (C). In case of entry to tertiary education, an additional variable 
appears in the regression, indicating the year when pupils graduated from secondary school 
(U). The results appear in Table 4; they are first estimated using a linear probability model 
(Eq.5) and then with logit (Eq.6). In Eq.6, self-assessment appears in its original form, and 
also as the difference between it and the competence scores. Because both variables are z-
standardized, we simply took the difference (self-assessment minus competence scores). 
Underestimated ability was established if the difference was greater than -1; overestimated 
ability if the difference was greater than 1; and relatively unbiased self-estimation if the 
difference fell between 1 and -1.  
 
   (Eq.5) 
 
   (Eq.6) 
 
Following the logic of Falch and Strom (2011) the parameter estimation of self-
assessment might be biased because of unobserved school-level heterogeneity, resulting from 
the fact that pupils (and teachers) are not randomly allocated to schools; also the quality of 
the school could influence self-assessment (in more competitive schools, school marks might 
be worse, and therefore self-assessment might suffer a downward bias). That said, school 
fixed effects are included in Eq.5. In Eq.7, S stands for school ID, and these models are fitted 
both with formal elementary and with current secondary school fixed effects (Table A4 in the 
Appendix). Note that including fixed effects in the logit model would be less effective, since 
every school where there is no variance in the dependent variable would fall out (again HLCS 
contains only samples from school class, and schools with few individual observations could 
easily drop out).  
 
(Eq.7) 
 
In the last section of the empirical analysis, we analyse the impact of self-assessment 
according to social status. In this section, two social-status groups are distinguished: low 
(parent’s highest school qualification is vocational) and high (parent’s highest school 
qualification is at least the high-school final exam).6 Because, in contrast to linear models, 
interpreting average marginal effects after logit is complicated (Ai and Norton, 2003; Norton, 
Wang and Ai, 2004; Cornelißen and Sonderhof, 2009; Buis, 2010), we estimated Eq.6 
separately for the two social-status groups (Table A5 in the Appendix), and we performed 
                                                 
6 The for combining two categories is, as Holm and Jæger (2008) showed, in many cases pupils are only 
encouraged to study until they reach the educational level of their parent. The high-school final exam seems to be 
a dividing line. Since compulsory education lasts until 18, fathers without a high-school final exam might suggest 
that their children choose vocational school. 
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Blinder–Oaxaca-type decomposition (Table 5) for non-linear models (Jann, 2008; Powers, 
Yoshioka and Yun, 2011).  
VI. RESULTS 
VI.1. THE DETERMINANTS OF SELF-ASSESSMENT 
 
In Table 3, the differences in self-assessment are analysed (Eq.4 is estimated). As one might 
expect, parental background is a powerful predictor of how someone estimates his own 
talent. Pupils from low-status families underestimate their abilities, compared to their peers 
in higher-status families (Model 1 in Table 3). The majority of observed differences in self-
assessment, however, could be attributed to the class differences in ability. Once school 
marks and competence scores are controlled for (Model 2), differences in self-assessment 
according to parental background decrease sharply.  
Since in Model 2 both school grades and competence scores (a standardized measure for 
school performance) are controlled for, and since both measures could be regarded as a proxy 
for ability, a possible interpretation of school marks would be feedback by teachers about 
school performance/behaviour at a given level of ability (competence scores). In this respect, 
it is noteworthy that the same unit change in school grade increases self-assessment by nearly 
twice as much as individual school performance (competence scores) measured by a 
standardized test. This result is supported by Model 3, where competence scores and the 
difference between school marks and (minus) competence scores appear in the regression. 
Self-assessment increases by nearly half a standard deviation (0.471) if the same level of 
competence score is rewarded with better school marks.  
The findings could be interpreted as indicating that it is a teacher’s responsibility to 
encourage pupils with better school marks. On the other hand, the result could be read from 
the perspective of the ‘big fish, little pond’ effect (Marsh and Hau, 2003; Marsh and Yeung, 
1998; Marsh et al., 2008), where low (!) school quality (assessed by class average 
performance) could increase self-assessment in the case of outstanding individual school 
performance (negative class average, positive individual effect). Note that the results from 
Model 2 show that both class average competence scores and individual deviation from the 
class average increase self-assessment. In other words, even if someone is in a competitive 
school class, his self-assessment would increase. At first sight this contradicts the ‘big fish, 
little pond’ hypothesis. However, one should consider that in our models class average 
competence scores and the individual deviation from the class average are employed, and not 
the competence scores and class average scores, as Marsh suggested. The interpretation of 
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class average in our models refers to the case if individual deviations are 0, in other words at 
the average performance of the class (not in the sample).  
Model 4 contains psychological traits that are in standard use. Higher social competences 
and higher self-esteem translated to higher self-assessment, while inclination to depression 
has a negative effect on self-perception. In subsequent models, external controls (measured 
using the Rotter scale) become significant at a borderline level, meaning that those who 
believe that external factors shape their lives (rather than their own actions and efforts – 
internal control) have lower self-assessment. Regarding the variables capturing the shock in 
self-assessment (Model 5), one can establish a positive effect for school quality. If someone 
attends a secondary school that is more competitive than their elementary school, a positive 
bias in self-assessment is more likely. It is also remarkable that the missing school-level 
information (manually replaced with 0) does not have a direct effect on self-assessment, and 
nor does success in the admissions test. 
Model 6 contains interaction effects in the full model. It turns out that on average the 
impact of individual competence scores does not vary by parental background. However, 
using predictions from Model 6, one should find significant class differences in the 
perception of one’s own abilities at the mean level of competence. This highlights the two 
facts that it is particularly difficult to assess mean-level performance, and that the offspring 
of higher-status families have an advantage, since they tend to assess the same level of 
competence higher than do their low-status peers.  
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Table 3 
Explaining self-assessment, OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
 
Number of model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimated equation      Eq.3 
Dependent variable 
Self-
assessment 
Self-
assessment 
Self-
assessment 
Self-
assessment 
Self-
assessment 
Self-
assessment 
Parent’s highest school qualification       
Elementary -0.520*** -0.074** -0.070** -0.065** -0.062** -0.067** 
 (0.036) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Vocational school -0.266*** -0.035 -0.033 -0.040* -0.037 -0.039* 
 (0.028) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
High-school final exam Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Tertiary 0.374*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.068** 0.065** 
 (0.035) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) 
School marks, PCA 8th grade  0.468***  0.444*** 0.423*** 0.423*** 
  (0.012)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Class average competence scores, 
8th grade 
 0.201***  0.193*** 0.219*** 0.218*** 
 (0.016)  (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Individual competence scores, 
deviation from class average, 8th 
grade  
 0.234***  0.224*** 0.216*** 0.212*** 
 (0.014)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) 
× Elementary      -0.031 
      (0.035) 
× Vocational school      0.015 
      (0.028) 
× High-school final exam      0.009 
× Tertiary      (0.032) 
      -0.031 
Competence scores, PCA, 8th grade   0.691***    
   (0.011)    
Diff. between school marks (PCA) 
and competence scores (PCA) 
  0.471***    
  (0.012)    
Rotter’s external control    -0.066 -0.069* -0.069* 
    (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Harter’s social competence scores    0.099*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 
    (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale    0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 
    (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Depression scale    -0.110*** -0.109*** -0.109*** 
    (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Admitted to first choice     0.012 0.012 
     (0.020) (0.020) 
Quality of upper-secondary school 
compared to elementary school 
    0.002*** 0.002*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
The difference in school quality is set 
to 0 
    0.042 0.042 
    (0.028) (0.028) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -242.530*** 6.576 7.526 13.855 16.419 15.141 
 (35.295) (28.610) (28.633) (28.166) (28.217) (28.289) 
Observations 9,050 9,050 9,050 9,050 9,050 9,050 
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R-squared 0.112 0.420 0.419 0.437 0.438 0.439 
F-stat 42.25*** 202.5*** 208.8*** 196.7*** 183.2*** 173.2*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Other controls (in vector C): male; year of birth; number of siblings; birth order; respondent needs 
special education; respondent is Roma; type of settlement; county 
 
VI.2. EDUCATIONAL CHOICES AND SELF-ASSESSMENT 
 
Table 4 summarizes the effect of self-assessment on educational decisions (Eq.5 and Eq.6 are 
estimated). Because there are three different types of dependent variables, three panels (A, B 
and C) appear in the table. Each block contains three models – linear probability model, logit 
and another specification of the logit model – where the impact of self-assessment is 
categorized. The impact of self-assessment is significant and positive for every model 
examined. It is worthy of note that the impact of self-assessment is higher if the choice 
between educational scenarios is more competitive. While one standard deviation increase in 
self-assessment increases the probability of someone choosing a secondary school (a school 
type that offers a high-school final exam) by some 1.5 percentage points, the same amount of 
increase translates to something like a 4.5 percentage point increase in probability if the 
choice is between a secondary general school (gimnázium) and a secondary vocational school 
(szakközépiskola). We also found a larger (approximately 4 percentage points) impact of self-
assessment when it comes to opting for tertiary education. The results also show that 
overestimated ability has an overwhelmingly positive effect, while underestimated ability is 
only penalized if it comes to a choice between secondary general and secondary vocational 
school. This means that, regardless of the definition of self-assessment (absolute or relative), 
its impact is larger if pupils make quality-based horizontal decisions within the secondary 
system.  
Parental background provides a stable effect on educational transitions. Compared to 
those whose fathers passed a high-school final exam, pupils from lower-status families have 
less probability of choosing a knowledge-intensive educational scenario in Panels A and B, 
while those from higher-status families have a greater chance (with the exception of Model 1). 
The difference between offspring with vocationally educated fathers and families with a 
household head who has passed a high-school final exam is not significant in Panel C.  
Ability also has a positive effect in educational transitions. Of the ability measures, class 
average competence scores seem to have the greatest impact, followed by school marks and 
individual school performance. These results are stable, even after the introduction of 
elementary school fixed effects (Panel A in Table A4 in the Appendix). In other words, the 
results make it clear that, in the decision to opt for a more competitive educational scenario, 
school effects (class average competence scores and school marks as a proxy for feedback 
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about individual performance in school) are more important than individual performance 
(the individual deviation from the class average in competence scores). It is also remarkable 
that psychological traits do not have a direct effect on educational transitions. However, 
variables capturing systematic bias in self-assessment as a retrospective measure do maintain 
a positive effect. Apparently this is a result of the fact that higher-ranking school types 
(secondary general school) are usually of better quality than vocational schools. To be on the 
safe side, we included secondary school fixed effects (Eq.7) in the regression (Panel B in 
Table A4 in the Appendix), in order to capture every systematic shock that might arise in self-
assessment. Applying secondary school fixed effects leads to a loss in sample size of 
approximately 200–400 observations. The impact of self-assessment is clearly lower, but is 
positive and statistically significant at the same level. The decrease in the parameters of 
ability and competence scores could be explained by the selection of pupils that occurs when 
pupils move from elementary to secondary education. Finally in models explaining the choice 
to opt for tertiary education, those who graduated in 2011 (compared to 2010) have a smaller 
chance of being admitted to tertiary education. This is very likely a consequence of the fact 
that those who graduated earlier could sit the admission test repeatedly.  
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Table 4 
The explanation of educational choice, regression results 
 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
Number of model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Population 8th grader in 2005/06 8th grader in 2005/06 Finished secondary school within 5 years 
Dependent variable Secondary school (1) versus vocational school (0) Sec. general school (1) versus sec. voc. school (0) Admitted to state-financed tertiary education  
Type of model Lin. prob. 
model 
Logit, av. marg. eff. Lin. prob. 
model 
Logit, av. marg. eff. Lin. prob. 
model 
Logit, av. marg. eff. 
Estimated equation Eq.5 Eq.6 Eq.6 Eq.5 Eq.6 Eq.6 Eq.5 Eq.6 Eq.6 
Self-assessment 0.015*** 0.017***  0.043*** 0.044***  0.039*** 0.036***  
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.010) (0.011)  
Underestimated 
abilities (diff.>-1) 
  -0.015   -0.054***   -0.021 
  (0.010)   (0.016)   (0.020) 
Relatively unbiased   Ref.   Ref.   Ref. 
Overestimated 
abilities (diff.<1) 
  0.020**   0.062***   0.080*** 
  (0.009)   (0.019)   (0.029) 
Parent’s school qual.          
Elementary -0.113*** -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.059*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.055** -0.071** -0.071** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) 
Vocational  -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
High school Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Tertiary -0.027*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.159*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 0.106*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
School marks  0.105*** 0.096*** 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.091*** 0.098*** 0.100*** 0.109*** 0.116*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Class average 
competence scores, 
8th grade 
0.101*** 0.134*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.138*** 0.170*** 0.134*** 0.123*** 0.150*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Individual 
competence score 
deviation from class 
0.038*** 0.062*** 0.072*** 0.047*** 0.038*** 0.069*** 0.104*** 0.093*** 0.117*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Rotter’s external 
control 
-0.021 -0.013 -0.014 -0.023 -0.021 -0.021 0.040 0.042 0.042 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
Social competence  0.003 -0.007 -0.006 0.013 0.012 0.014 -0.018 -0.014 -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Self-esteem 0.011 0.015* 0.016* -0.014 -0.013 -0.009 0.012 0.010 0.015 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
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Depression scale 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.023 0.020 0.020 0.025 0.031 0.032 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) 
 
Admitted to first 
choice  -0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.033** -0.037*** -0.037*** 0.018 0.013 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Quality of sec. school  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Difference in school 
quality is 0 
-0.020 -0.028*** -0.028*** 0.131*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.014 0.014 0.015 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
Graduated in 2011 
(reference: year 2010) 
      -0.070*** -0.075*** -0.075*** 
      (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant -80.202***    9.924   -27.289   
 (13.753)   (20.785)   (28.624)   
Observations 9,050 9,050 9,050 6,316 6,316 6,316 3,905 3,905 3,905 
R-squared 0.342 0.397 0.396 0.309 0.268 0.267 0.248 0.225 0.224 
F-stat 128.8***   89.83***   34.02***   
p  . .       
Log likelihood  -34168 -34222  -40760 -40846  -26234 -26269 
chi2  1898*** 1890***  1175*** 1163***  671.3*** 662.4*** 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Other controls (in vector C): male; year of birth; number of siblings; birth order; respondent needs special education; respondent is Roma; type of settlement; 
county 
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Estimations from Eq.5 and Eq.6 could be biased because of unobserved mechanisms in 
selectivity. In analysis of the choice between secondary school and vocational school, the data 
are right censored, since the best-performing and most highly motivated pupils from high-
status families are likely to have gone to 6- or 8-grade secondary schools, and hence they 
probably made an educational decision at age 10 or 12 (which means they are missing from 
the sample). This censoring could suggest a downward bias in means. Following the logic of 
Cameron and Heckman (1998), if pupils with high socioeconomic status have a better chance 
of choosing knowledge-intensive educational scenarios, then those children with low 
socioeconomic status must have an especially positive set of unobserved characteristics. The 
bias in self-assessment could be in the opposite direction in the case of a choice between 
secondary general and secondary vocational school, or in the case of admission to tertiary 
education. In these settings, the worst-performing, most poorly motivated pupils from low-
status families are missing (since they went to vocational schools). Controlling for sample 
selection with the two-stage method proposed by Heckman (1979), the results seem to be 
stable.  
 
VI.3. THE CONTRIBUTION OF SELF-ASSESSMENT TO TOTAL STATUS DIFFERENCES 
IN EDUCATIONAL DECISIONS 
 
In previous sections it was shown that pupils with different parental backgrounds estimate 
the same level of ability differently (Figure 4), and that self-assessment contributes 
significantly to the decision to opt for more knowledge-intensive educational routes (Table 
4). In this section our aim is to show the impact of self-assessment in the explanation of total 
status differences in educational decisions. Blinder–Oaxaca-type decomposition is performed 
on the data, where the grouping variable is low status (father with vocational education or 
below) or high status (father with at least high-school final exam). This type of analysis is 
practically equivalent to models with a full set of interactions.  
The results are summarized in Table 5. There are three panels in the table, and each 
refers to a different logit model in Table 4 (Eq.6). The difference in outcome variables 
according to low- and high-status pupils appears in the row ‘Difference’. As Jann (2008) 
points out, these differences should be interpreted from the viewpoint of group B, which is 
the high-status group in this case. Compared to high-status pupils, low-status students are on 
average nearly 22 percentage points less likely to choose a secondary school (secondary 
general or secondary vocational) than a vocational school (Panel A). The same difference is 21 
and 16 percentage points in Panels B and C, respectively. It is overwhelmingly differences in 
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characteristics (endowment effects) that are responsible for this finding. Endowment effects 
explain more than 80 per cent of total differences in Panel A, and approximately 65 per cent 
of differences in Panels B and C.  
If high-status pupils had the same level of self-assessment as their low-status peers, the 
difference in the endowment effects would decrease (Columns 1, 4 and 7 in Table 5). This 
means, in other words, that low-status respondents have lower means in self-assessment. The 
drop in total status difference (the ratio of endowment effects in self-assessment and total 
status differences) would be some 5 percentage points (in Panel A and B) and some 7 
percentage points (in Panel C) if the high-status group had the same mean in self-assessment 
as the low-status group. The results reveal that differences in self-assessment are important 
in the status differences of educational choices, and differences in the impact of self-
assessment exist mainly because low-status pupils estimate their abilities lower.  
The coefficient effect of self-assessment in Columns 2, 5 and 8 of Table 5 shows the 
consequences of the hypothetical case where high-status pupils are treated the same way as 
low-status pupils (practically using the same regression coefficient for high-status pupils that 
was estimated for their low-status peers). Status differences due to self-assessment will not 
change in Panels A and C (parameters are not significant), meaning that low-status pupils 
would not be discriminated against if they gave a high assessment of their abilities. However, 
if the choice is between secondary general and secondary vocational school (Panel B)status 
differences will increase (the coefficient is significant at a borderline level). The positive sign 
of this coefficient means that the impact of self-assessment is higher in the case of low-status 
respondents. Note that this choice is rather a quality-based, horizontal educational decision, 
since pupils in the higher class are pushed by their class position to choose the most 
competitive secondary track in order to enhance their chances of later going to university and 
thus of avoiding downward mobility. Consequently, subjective beliefs play a less-important 
role in the decision among higher-status pupils than among those with lower status. This 
finding is revealed as a result of logit regressions, where the same models are fitted separately 
for the two groups of pupils (Panel B in Table A5 in the Appendix). Interestingly, even though 
low-status pupils benefit from the impact of their self-assessment (coefficient effect), since on 
average they have lower self-assessment (endowment effect), this fact counterbalances the 
positive gain in the regression parameters.  
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Table 5 
Blinder–Oaxaca type decomposition of educational choice between low-status (parent’s highest school qualification is 
vocational) and high-status (parent’s highest school qualification minimum high-school final exam) respondents 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
Number of model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ref. model in Table 4 (2) (5) (8) 
Population 8th grader in 2005/06 8th grader in 2005/06 Finished secondary school within 5 years 
Dependent variable Secondary school (1) vs. vocational school (0) Sec. general school (1) vs. sec. voc. school (0) Admitted to state-financed tertiary education  
 Overall model Overall model Overall model 
Low status 0.689*** 0.305*** 0.243*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
High status 0.905*** 0.514*** 0.407*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) 
Difference -0.216*** -0.209*** -0.164*** 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.016) 
Endowments -0.179*** -0.141*** -0.106*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
Coefficients -0.042*** -0.097*** -0.055*** 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.019) 
Interaction 0.005 0.029*** -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) 
 Endowments Coefficients Interaction Endowments Coefficients Interaction Endowments Coefficients Interaction 
Self-assessment -0.012*** -0.002 0.001 -0.011** 0.017* -0.018 -0.012*** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012) (0.001) 
School marks  -0.047*** -0.001 0.000 -0.041*** -0.003 0.002 -0.033*** -0.002 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.014) (0.012) (0.006) (0.018) (0.001) 
Class average 
competence scores, 
8th grade 
-0.051*** -0.003 0.001 -0.059*** -0.005 0.006 -0.036*** 0.032** -0.005 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.016) 
Individual 
competence scores 
deviation from class 
-0.020*** -0.003** 0.001 -0.012*** -0.012 0.009 -0.016*** 0.001 -0.000 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.001) 
Rotter’s external 
control 0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.001) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) 
Social competence  0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.198** 0.001 -0.000 -0.208** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.001) (0.087) (0.001) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000) 
Self-esteem -0.000 0.009 -0.000 0.002 0.093 -0.003 0.000 0.082 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.017) (0.000) (0.001) (0.071) (0.002) (0.001) (0.076) (0.001) 
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Depression scale -0.001 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.001 0.001 -0.018 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.016) (0.000) (0.001) (0.073) (0.002) (0.001) (0.081) (0.000) 
 
 
Admitted to first 
choice  -0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.001 -0.020 0.001 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.022) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.000) 
Quality of upper-sec. 
school  
-0.007*** -0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.000 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Difference in school 
quality is 0 
-0.001** 0.002** 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Graduated in 2011 
(reference: year 2010) 
      0.004** -0.005 0.000 
      (0.002) (0.011) (0.001) 
Constant  -0.044   -16.691   -13.447  
  (10.072)   (46.708)   (52.745)  
Observations 9,050 9,050 9,050 6,316 6,316 6,316 3,905 3,905 3,905 
Number of low status 5806 5806 5806 5806 3469 3469 3469 3469 1957 
Number of high status 3244 3244 3244 3244 2847 2847 2847 2847 1948 
 
Eq.6. is decomposed in this table. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Other controls (in vector C): male; year of birth; number of siblings; birth order; respondent needs special education; respondent is Roma; type of settlement; 
county 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
The empirical results suggest considerable differences in self-assessment between social 
classes. It has also been established that self-assessment contributes significantly to the 
decision to choose a more knowledge-intensive educational route. One standard deviation 
gain in self-assessment contributes to a 1.5–4.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of 
a more knowledge-intensive educational choice. The decomposition of status differences in 
educational choices showed that self-assessment would decrease initial status differences in 
educational decision by some 5–7 percentage points. Status differences in the impact of self-
assessment mainly exist because higher-status pupils have higher self-assessment than their 
more disadvantaged peers. However, compared to their high-status peers, among pupils from 
low-status groups self-assessment has a higher impact when it comes to a choice between 
academic (gimnázium) or practically oriented (szakközépiskola) secondary school. These 
results suggest that a soft skill (such as recognizing one’s own abilities) can have a long-
lasting impact on educational career. Our findings are consistent with those of Tolsma, Need 
and de Jong (2010), who found success probability a significant explanatory mechanism in 
participation in Dutch higher education. Similarly to that finding, we also found significant 
status differences even after controlling for self-assessment, which suggests that unexplained 
status differences cannot entirely be attributed to differences in self-assessment. However, 
contrary to Tolsma, Need and de Jong (2010), we found that the impact of self-assessment on 
educational decisions varies according to social class position, which underlines the fact that 
self-assessment is an important factor in status difference in educational choices, and opens 
up new questions about the origin of this difference.  
Future research should therefore clarify the mechanisms in the family that contribute to 
the different levels of self-assessment according to parental background. Our knowledge is 
still limited as to how low/high-status pupils are treated in their families for the same level of 
school performance. At this point the results may be biased, since unobserved family-level 
heterogeneity is not covered (We only assumed that these differences are captured by the 
status variable.) However, the results are stable once unobserved school-level differences are 
accounted for (note that unobserved family factors and school-level factors should be highly 
correlated). We also have some limited means to deal with unobserved individual 
characteristics that can modify self-assessment. Even though we were able to control for 
some psychological variables, assuming that these measures capture time-invariant 
individual-level heterogeneity, the impact of self-assessment might be measured with 
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unobserved motivations, ambitions and preferences for an anticipated educational 
qualification, or even parental expectations.  
The findings could have important policy implications. As previous research has pointed 
out, children’s ability-related beliefs begin to decline at middle-school age (Eccles et al., 1989; 
Wigfield et al., 1991) partly because they have more realistic information about themselves, 
or because the school environment becomes more competitive around then (Stipek, 1996). 
The most important decisions about further education, however, are made precisely in those 
years. If self-assessment plays a crucial role in why talented low-status pupils are reluctant to 
choose knowledge-intensive educational routes, some policy initiative should help pupils 
towards realistic perceptions of their own talent. As the results in Table 3 indicated, self-
assessment is much more dependent on school marks than on a standardized measure of 
competence scores. The results (not included in this paper) also show that, for the same level 
of competence, lower-status pupils receive lower school marks than their higher-status peers. 
Thus teachers should be much more supportive of lower-status pupils, since the feedback 
that these pupils receive in the form of school marks can have a negative effect on self-
assessment, and low self-assessment contributes to suboptimal educational decisions.  
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 
The association between educational motivation and probability of success – 
points of equilibrium and perceived deviation from it, by parental background 
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FIGURES IN APPENDIX 
Figure A1 
The waves of HLCS and some important events during the time represented 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2 
Educational choices and scenarios in Hungary 
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TABLES  
Table 1 
Mean, standard deviation and number of cases of the three dependent variables 
in analysis, by parental background 
 
 Dependent variables used in the analysis  
 
Parental 
background 
 
Admitted to secondary 
school/vocational school 
Admitted to secondary 
general 
school/secondary 
vocational school 
Admitted to state-
financed tertiary 
education training 
Elementary school 
mean 45.63% 18.72% 12.53% 
sd 49.82% 39.03% 33.15% 
N 1979 903 391 
Vocational school 
mean 67.05% 27.71% 21.52% 
sd 47.01% 44.76% 41.11% 
N 3827 2566 1566 
High-school final 
exam 
mean 84.70% 39.91% 32.06% 
sd 36.01% 48.99% 46.69% 
N 2189 1854 1235 
Tertiary education 
mean 94.12% 66.87% 52.03% 
sd 23.53% 47.09% 49.99% 
N 1055 993 713 
Total 
mean 69.79% 36.16% 29.53% 
sd 45.92% 48.05% 45.62% 
N 9050 6316 3905 
Table 2 
Mean, standard deviation and number of cases of self-assessment and the most 
important ability measures in 8th grade, by parental background  
(every variable is standardized) 
Parental 
background 
 Self-assessment 
(standardized) 
Competence-scores 
(standardized) 
School-marks 
(standardized) 
Elementary school 
mean -0.45 -0.62 -0.42 
sd 0.87 0.81 0.94 
N 1979 1979 1979 
Vocational school 
mean -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 
sd 0.95 0.87 0.97 
N 3827 3827 3827 
High-school final 
exam 
mean 0.28 0.34 0.24 
sd 0.97 0.95 0.96 
N 2189 2189 2189 
Tertiary education 
mean 0.74 0.85 0.62 
sd 0.88 1.01 0.89 
N 1055 1055 1055 
Total 
mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 
sd 1.00 1.00 1.00 
N 9050 9050 9050 
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Table 3 
Explaining self-assessment, OLS coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses 
Number of model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimated equation      Eq.3 
Dependent variable 
Self-
assessment 
Self-
assessment 
Self-
assessment 
Self-
assessment 
Self-
assessment 
Self-
assessment 
Parent’s highest school qualification       
Elementary -0.520*** -0.074** -0.070** -0.065** -0.062** -0.067** 
 (0.036) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Vocational school -0.266*** -0.035 -0.033 -0.040* -0.037 -0.039* 
 (0.028) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
High-school final exam Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Tertiary 0.374*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.068** 0.065** 
 (0.035) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) 
School marks, PCA 8th grade  0.468***  0.444*** 0.423*** 0.423*** 
  (0.012)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Class average competence scores, 
8th grade 
 0.201***  0.193*** 0.219*** 0.218*** 
 (0.016)  (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Individual competence scores, 
deviation from class average, 8th 
grade  
 0.234***  0.224*** 0.216*** 0.212*** 
 (0.014)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) 
× Elementary      -0.031 
      (0.035) 
× Vocational school      0.015 
      (0.028) 
× High-school final exam      0.009 
× Tertiary      (0.032) 
      -0.031 
Competence scores, PCA, 8th grade   0.691***    
   (0.011)    
Diff. between school marks (PCA) 
and competence scores (PCA) 
  0.471***    
  (0.012)    
Rotter’s external control    -0.066 -0.069* -0.069* 
    (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Harter’s social competence scores    0.099*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 
    (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale    0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 
    (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Depression scale    -0.110*** -0.109*** -0.109*** 
    (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Admitted to first choice     0.012 0.012 
     (0.020) (0.020) 
Quality of upper-secondary school 
compared to elementary school 
    0.002*** 0.002*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
The difference in school quality is 
set to 0 
    0.042 0.042 
    (0.028) (0.028) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -242.530*** 6.576 7.526 13.855 16.419 15.141 
 (35.295) (28.610) (28.633) (28.166) (28.217) (28.289) 
Observations 9,050 9,050 9,050 9,050 9,050 9,050 
R-squared 0.112 0.420 0.419 0.437 0.438 0.439 
F-stat 42.25*** 202.5*** 208.8*** 196.7*** 183.2*** 173.2*** 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Other controls (in vector C): male; year of birth; number of siblings; birth order; respondent needs 
special education; respondent is Roma; type of settlement; county 
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Table 4 
The explanation of educational choice, regression results 
 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
Number of model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Population 8th grader in 2005/06 8th grader in 2005/06 Finished secondary school within 5 years 
Dependent variable Secondary school (1) versus vocational school (0) Sec. general school (1) versus sec. voc. school (0) Admitted to state-financed tertiary education  
Type of model Lin. prob. 
model 
Logit, av. marg. eff. Lin. prob. 
model 
Logit, av. marg. eff. Lin. prob. 
model 
Logit, av. marg. eff. 
Estimated equation Eq.5 Eq.6 Eq.6 Eq.5 Eq.6 Eq.6 Eq.5 Eq.6 Eq.6 
Self-assessment 0.015*** 0.017***  0.043*** 0.044***  0.039*** 0.036***  
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.010) (0.011)  
Underestimated 
abilities (diff.>-1) 
  -0.015   -0.054***   -0.021 
  (0.010)   (0.016)   (0.020) 
Relatively unbiased   Ref.   Ref.   Ref. 
Overestimated 
abilities (diff.<1) 
  0.020**   0.062***   0.080*** 
  (0.009)   (0.019)   (0.029) 
Parent’s school qual.          
Elementary -0.113*** -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.059*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.055** -0.071** -0.071** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) 
Vocational  -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
High school Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Tertiary -0.027*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.159*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 0.106*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
School marks  0.105*** 0.096*** 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.091*** 0.098*** 0.100*** 0.109*** 0.116*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Class average 
competence scores, 
8th grade 
0.101*** 0.134*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.138*** 0.170*** 0.134*** 0.123*** 0.150*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Individual 
competence score 
deviation from class 
0.038*** 0.062*** 0.072*** 0.047*** 0.038*** 0.069*** 0.104*** 0.093*** 0.117*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Rotter’s external 
control 
-0.021 -0.013 -0.014 -0.023 -0.021 -0.021 0.040 0.042 0.042 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
Social competence  0.003 -0.007 -0.006 0.013 0.012 0.014 -0.018 -0.014 -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Self-esteem 0.011 0.015* 0.016* -0.014 -0.013 -0.009 0.012 0.010 0.015 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Depression scale 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.023 0.020 0.020 0.025 0.031 0.032 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) 
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Admitted to first 
choice  -0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.033** -0.037*** -0.037*** 0.018 0.013 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Quality of sec. school  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Difference in school 
quality is 0 
-0.020 -0.028*** -0.028*** 0.131*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.014 0.014 0.015 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
Graduated in 2011 
(reference: year 2010) 
      -0.070*** -0.075*** -0.075*** 
      (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant -80.202***    9.924   -27.289   
 (13.753)   (20.785)   (28.624)   
Observations 9,050 9,050 9,050 6,316 6,316 6,316 3,905 3,905 3,905 
R-squared 0.342 0.397 0.396 0.309 0.268 0.267 0.248 0.225 0.224 
F-stat 128.8***   89.83***   34.02***   
p  . .       
Log likelihood  -34168 -34222  -40760 -40846  -26234 -26269 
chi2  1898*** 1890***  1175*** 1163***  671.3*** 662.4*** 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Other controls (in vector C): male; year of birth; number of siblings; birth order; respondent needs special education; respondent is Roma; type of settlement; 
county 
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Table 5 
Blinder–Oaxaca type decomposition of educational choice between low-status (parent’s highest school qualification is vocational) and 
high-status (parent’s highest school qualification minimum high-school final exam) respondents 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
Number of model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ref. model in Table 4 (2) (5) (8) 
Population 8th grader in 2005/06 8th grader in 2005/06 Finished secondary school within 5 years 
Dependent variable Secondary school (1) vs. vocational school (0) Sec. general school (1) vs. sec. voc. school (0) Admitted to state-financed tertiary education  
 Overall model Overall model Overall model 
Low status 0.689*** 0.305*** 0.243*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
High status 0.905*** 0.514*** 0.407*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) 
Difference -0.216*** -0.209*** -0.164*** 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.016) 
Endowments -0.179*** -0.141*** -0.106*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
Coefficients -0.042*** -0.097*** -0.055*** 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.019) 
Interaction 0.005 0.029*** -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) 
 Endowments Coefficients Interaction Endowments Coefficients Interaction Endowments Coefficients Interaction 
Self-assessment -0.012*** -0.002 0.001 -0.011** 0.017* -0.018 -0.012*** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012) (0.001) 
School marks  -0.047*** -0.001 0.000 -0.041*** -0.003 0.002 -0.033*** -0.002 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.014) (0.012) (0.006) (0.018) (0.001) 
Class average 
competence scores, 
8th grade 
-0.051*** -0.003 0.001 -0.059*** -0.005 0.006 -0.036*** 0.032** -0.005 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.016) 
Individual 
competence scores 
deviation from class 
-0.020*** -0.003** 0.001 -0.012*** -0.012 0.009 -0.016*** 0.001 -0.000 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.001) 
Rotter’s external 
control 0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.001) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) 
Social competence  0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.198** 0.001 -0.000 -0.208** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.001) (0.087) (0.001) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000) 
Self-esteem -0.000 0.009 -0.000 0.002 0.093 -0.003 0.000 0.082 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.017) (0.000) (0.001) (0.071) (0.002) (0.001) (0.076) (0.001) 
Depression scale -0.001 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.001 0.001 -0.018 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.016) (0.000) (0.001) (0.073) (0.002) (0.001) (0.081) (0.000) 
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Admitted to first 
choice  -0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.001 -0.020 0.001 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.022) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.000) 
Quality of upper-sec. 
school  
-0.007*** -0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.000 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Difference in school 
quality is 0 
-0.001** 0.002** 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Graduated in 2011 
(reference: year 2010) 
      0.004** -0.005 0.000 
      (0.002) (0.011) (0.001) 
Constant  -0.044   -16.691   -13.447  
  (10.072)   (46.708)   (52.745)  
Observations 9,050 9,050 9,050 6,316 6,316 6,316 3,905 3,905 3,905 
Number of low status 5806 5806 5806 5806 3469 3469 3469 3469 1957 
Number of high status 3244 3244 3244 3244 2847 2847 2847 2847 1948 
 
Eq.6. is decomposed in this table. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Other controls (in vector C): male; year of birth; number of siblings; birth order; respondent needs special education; respondent is Roma; type of settlement; county 
TABLES IN APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 
Descriptive statistics about the components of competence scores and school 
marks principal components (PCA)  
 
 
 Competence scores PCA School marks PCA 
Parental 
background 
 Maths 
competence 
scores 
Reading 
competence 
scores 
School marks 
Maths 
School marks 
Hungarian 
grammar 
School marks 
Hungarian 
literature 
Elementary 
school 
mean 403.55 400.95 2.81 3.05 3.25 
sd 81.61 83.98 0.87 0.87 0.93 
N 1979 1979 1979 1979 1979 
Vocational 
school 
mean 453.16 446.47 3.09 3.34 3.54 
sd 87.69 90.26 0.95 0.95 0.97 
N 3827 3827 3827 3827 3827 
High-school 
final exam 
mean 497.76 486.91 3.45 3.69 3.91 
sd 96.70 96.72 0.99 0.96 0.94 
N 2189 2189 2189 2189 2189 
Tertiary 
education 
mean 545.14 536.02 3.90 4.10 4.31 
sd 104.23 103.55 0.97 0.86 0.82 
N 1055 1055 1055 1055 1055 
Total 
mean 463.82 456.74 3.21 3.45 3.66 
sd 100.63 100.87 1.00 0.98 0.99 
N 9050 9050 9050 9050 9050 
In Hungary there are 5 school-marks: 1 is the worst, 5 is the best.  
 
Table A2 
Correlation coefficients between school mark PCA and its components as 
primary variables 
 
Maths school marks, 8th grade 0.84 
Hungarian grammar school marks, 8th grade 0.93 
Hungarian literature, 8th grade 0.91 
 
Table A3 
Correlation coefficients between competence scores PCA and its components as 
primary variables 
 
Maths competence scores, 8th grade 0.94 
Reading competence scores, 8th grade 0.93 
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Table A4 
The explanation of educational choice, results from linear probability models  
with school fixed effects 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
Number of model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Comparable with model in Table 4 (1) (4) (7) (1) (4) (7) 
 Elementary school fixed effects Secondary school fixed effects 
Dependent variable Secondary 
school (1) vs. 
vocational 
school (0) 
Sec. general 
school (1) vs. 
sec. voc. 
school (0) 
Admitted to 
state-
financed 
tertiary 
education 
Secondary 
school (1) vs. 
vocational 
school (0) 
Sec. general 
school (1) vs. 
sec. voc. 
school (0) 
Admitted to 
state-
financed 
tertiary 
education 
Self-assessment 0.018*** 0.045*** 0.036*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.031*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) 
Parent’s highest school qualification       
Elementary -0.087*** -0.046* -0.058* -0.062*** -0.040*** -0.082*** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.034) (0.015) (0.015) (0.030) 
Vocational school -0.027*** -0.023 -0.031 -0.025*** -0.021** -0.035* 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.022) (0.009) (0.010) (0.021) 
High-school final exam Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Tertiary -0.025** 0.117*** 0.093*** 0.002 0.038*** 0.053* 
 (0.011) (0.021) (0.029) (0.009) (0.012) (0.027) 
School marks, PCA 8th grade 0.109*** 0.082*** 0.090*** 0.098*** 0.026*** 0.081*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) 
Class average competence scores, 
PCA 8th grade 
0.111*** 0.116*** 0.181*** 0.056*** 0.025*** 0.075*** 
(0.023) (0.040) (0.060) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) 
Individual competence scores, PCA 
8th grade  
0.026*** 0.033*** 0.106*** 0.037*** 0.027*** 0.097*** 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) 
Rotter’s external control -0.023 0.001 0.042 -0.002 0.003 0.063 
 (0.020) (0.031) (0.045) (0.018) (0.019) (0.039) 
Harter’s social competence scores 0.008 0.013 -0.028 0.001 0.007 -0.003 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.021) (0.008) (0.009) (0.018) 
Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale 0.020* -0.002 0.019 0.017* -0.017 0.038* 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.025) (0.010) (0.010) (0.023) 
Depression scale 0.015 0.028 0.034 0.017 -0.011 0.006 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.046) (0.019) (0.020) (0.043) 
Admitted to first choice -0.013 -0.042*** 0.002 -0.010 -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.021) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020) 
Quality of upper-secondary school 
compared to elementary school 
0.003*** 0.006*** 0.003***    
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Diff. in school quality is set to 0 0.018 0.147*** 0.001    
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.035)    
Graduated in 2011 (reference: year 
2010) 
  -0.048**   -0.072*** 
  (0.020)   (0.020) 
Constant -70.828*** 10.095 1.021 -46.939*** -0.954 14.901 
 (15.200) (23.105) (36.338) (14.264) (14.774) (32.863) 
Observations 9,050 6,316 3,905 8,647 6,056 3,749 
R2 0.509 0.540 0.517 0.510 0.783 0.444 
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.384 0.278 0.440 0.740 0.272 
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Eq.7. was estimated in this table. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Other controls (in vector C): male; year of birth; number of siblings; birth order; respondent needs 
special education; respondent is Roma; type of settlement; county 
School effects are absorbed. 
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Table A5 
Logit average marginal effects, separate models for low-status (parent’s highest 
school qualification is vocational) and high-status (parent’s highest school 
qualification is minimum high-school final exam) pupils 
 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
Number of model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Refers to Panel model in Table 5 (A) (A) (B) (B) (C) (C) 
Dependent variable Secondary school (1) vs. 
vocational school (0) 
Sec. general school (1) vs. 
sec. voc. school (0) 
Admitted to state-financed 
tertiary education 
Subsample Low status High status Low status High status Low status High status 
Self-assessment 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.054*** 0.030** 0.031** 0.043*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) 
School marks, PCA 8th grade 0.128*** 0.053*** 0.088*** 0.106*** 0.092*** 0.129*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) 
Class average competence scores, 
PCA 8th grade 
0.171*** 0.079*** 0.133*** 0.165*** 0.154*** 0.120*** 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023) 
Individual competence scores, PCA 
8th grade  
0.074*** 0.044*** 0.026** 0.060*** 0.084*** 0.111*** 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) 
Rotter’s external control -0.026 0.006 -0.013 -0.037 0.048 0.046 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.035) (0.042) (0.045) (0.052) 
Harter’s social competence scores -0.009 -0.002 -0.015 0.045** -0.046** 0.021 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025) 
Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale 0.023* 0.003 0.004 -0.039* 0.029 -0.010 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) 
Depression scale 0.025 -0.013 0.028 0.007 0.018 0.044 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.038) (0.044) (0.050) (0.055) 
Admitted to first choice -0.000 0.014 -0.047*** -0.027 0.014 0.015 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.017) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) 
Quality of upper-secondary school 
compared to elementary school 
0.002*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diff. in school quality is set to 0 -0.024 -0.036*** 0.124*** 0.148*** -0.017 0.038 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.024) (0.031) (0.037) (0.040) 
Graduated in 2011 (reference: year 
2010) 
    -0.070*** -0.078*** 
    (0.023) (0.023) 
Observations 5,806 3,244 3,469 2,847 1,957 1,948 
Log likelihood -26353 -7546 -20406 -20405 -11270 -14719 
Chi-squared 1300*** 471.2*** 562.1*** 555.8*** 305.1*** 337.8*** 
R2 0.332 0.439 0.243 0.241 0.243 0.188 
 
Eq.6. was estimated in this table. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Other controls (in vector C): male; year of birth; number of siblings; birth order; respondent needs 
special education; respondent is Roma; type of settlement; county 
 
 
 
